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Introduction
As Maurice Roche has pointed out, Olympic Games (like football World Cups) are 'mega-events'. As 'large scale cultural events which have a dramatic character, mass popular appeal, and international significance', they offer unique public relations opportunities for the host nation. 1 Munich '72 was West Germany's first high-profile chance to self-represent itself on home soil to audiences abroad since National Socialism. 2 Conceived during the Adenauer era as a means of reintegration into the international community, it was a strategy the Munich Games continued to follow. 4 From conception to completion, Munich '72 was largely the brainchild of Willi Daume, a man whose career as West Germany's leading sport functionary was made in the 1950s and 1960s. 5 Daume first saw his chance with the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in 1965; quickly convinced Munich's mayor Hans-Jochen Vogel to put his city forward; helped secure government funding; and as president of the 1972 Organizing Committee (OC) worked tirelessly to make the Games a success. Daume was an idealist who saw participation in sports as a universal human entitlement and this entailed helping the nations in the 'developing world' to participate in high-performance sports events including the Olympics. As he stated in a well-publicized speech delivered in Nigeria in 1970, the Munich Olympics were intended to be 'characterized by respect for all races and men'. 6 This meant that special care was expended on advertisement in Africa.
However, given West Germany's integration into the Western system of political, economic, and military alliances, it was even more important to use the Munich Olympics to advertise the country to its former enemies and current allies and partners in Europe and across the Atlantic. Beyond the symbolic importance of strengthening ties by playing host to the Western world, promoting the Games and the country in these parts of the world also served eminently practical purposes, such as strengthening the domestic tourism industry and ensuring that the Olympic venues would be filled with visitors.
At the same time, given the spirit of restraint on the one hand and the lavish expenditure on the architecture of the Games on the other -exemplified in the famous tent-shaped Munich stadium roof which in itself came to symbolize and advertise the openness and transparency of West German democracy -little was left for PR and advertisement in the narrow sense. To be precise, Otto Haas, formerly the director of Munich's tourist office and in charge of a dozen full-time employees from January 1968, had only DM 10 million at his disposal. This was the equivalent of half-a-percent of the entire Olympic budget of c. DM 2 billion. 7 Paulmann states that an important side-effect of cultural diplomacy is that the image projected to foreign audiences also influenced how Germans saw themselves and the state in which they lived. Since the 1950s it set in motion a process of learning what it meant to be German and contributed markedly to the formation of identities through 'an interplay of self-perceptions'. In other words, Germans increasingly saw themselves through the prism of how they and their country were represented abroad. 8 However, as the Munich organizers had to find out, there was no direct correlation between the good will for the 1972 Games created abroad and the West German public's support of the event. While the overall attitude of the population had been largely positive, when Munich won the bid, over the years that supportive attitude waned. Some of this was due to the fact that the primary PR focus was laid on audiences abroad, with relatively belated attention paid to the German public. More importantly, however, with the exception of a marked dip in the immediate run-up to the Games, the German public's attitude roughly followed a logic which has also been observed for other host cities and countries of Olympic Games: from expectation to criticism, to agreement and euphoria.
Mexico City 1968
Advertising the nation abroad was not always easy. One episode illustrates the problem perfectly. According to IOC regulations (Art. 54) the Munich organizers were allowed to advertise the Games internationally only after the preceding Olympics had ended, so not to endanger their success. As opposed to its other activities, this meant that the OC could only begin its foreign PR after the end of the Mexico-City Olympics which took place as late as October 1968 for climatic reasons. The Mexicans insisted on this point and went so far as to largely prevent advertisement for Munich during their Games or, at least, 'seriously hindered' it, as the Munich OC would emphasize quite undiplomatically in its official report after the Munich Games. 9 Not that the Mexicans were uncooperative without good reason. 'Winning friends for the Federal Republic' abroad, the overarching aim of Munich's PR, 10 had already gone badly wrong before the campaign had even got off the ground. The Mexicans, the first country in the 'Third World' to host Olympic Games, were certainly insecure.
This was not only because of the much debated issue of hosting the Games at high altitude issue but more importantly due to the way they were portrayed abroad. The
Western press customarily depicted Mexicans as an apathetic, lazy, and backward people. Along with their doubts over what effects altitude would have on athletic performances, many foreign commentators warned of chaotic and badly-organized Games, which the country moreover could barely afford. An article in Der Spiegel in early 1968, for example, which was widely reported in the Mexican papers, ridiculed the American-Indian heritage of the country's population and questioned its ability to stage the Games let alone win any medals. 11 While the Mexico Games went on to become a pinnacle of self-representation not just for the Mexican nation-state but for Latin America as a whole and arguably the entire 'Third World' 12 , this was not clear in the run-up when international doubts dominated. In such a climate the Mexicans created problems for the Germans wherever they could. For instance, they insisted that whatever PR measures the Munich delegation had planned, including, most importantly, a press conference, would have to wait until after the Closing Ceremony when journalists from all over the world were on the way to the airport or had already departed. Despite protestations with the IOC in Lausanne, the Munich organizers had no choice but to comply with the Mexicans' wishes. 13 With the exception of an exhibit and the customary reception in Mexico City's Plaza Hotel, where members of the IOC, the local OC and the international sporting federations were wined and dined, all other measures had to be postponed or cancelled. 14 16 
Africa
In the grand scheme of things, however, the West Germans' low reputation among the organizers of the Mexico Games mattered little since overall Germany and the Germans enjoyed a rather positive image in Latin America. 17 Moreover, pragmatic reasons stood in the way of making greater efforts there. While the general PR and advertisement concept, as formulated in January 1969, stated that the 'ambition [of the organizers] should be to attract as many visitors as possible from as many countries as possible to Munich and Germany' 18 , in reality it was clear from the outset that the relatively small budget was best spent in a focused fashion. This meant in effect that Latin American countries along with other poorer regions of the world, which were unlikely to send many visitors, would receive limited PR attention, relatively late in the run-up to the event.
Africa, however, was an exception. Even if, as Haas stressed in an internal position paper, the Munich organizers could not expect many visitors from that continent either, the 'young continent' could not be ignored since much had been made of its participation of Africans during the application phase. In addition to 'humane', 'serene' (heiter), 'spatially compact', and 'green' Games that aimed at a Coubertinian synthesis of culture and sport, the Munich bid had promised that the 1972 Olympics would be Games for the newly decolonized nations. 19 Moreover, while it could be safely assumed that most Latin American IOC votes had gone to 21 The realm of sport was no exception. Haas therefore echoed Daume's views when he noted that the Munich organizers had a 'certain political and sports obligation to keep the African population well-informed' about the Games. 22 Accordingly, DM 1 million of extra funds donated by the record label Ariola were made available to enhance Germany's image in Africa alone. African views of Germany were considered problematic in that they were very much characterized by the opposite of what Munich aimed to project. As a legacy of recent history and German colonialism, the predominant image was that of the 'masculine' 'soldier, brave both in attack and defence, loyal and adept at using his weapons'. 'Selfrestraint, unconditional obedience, and preference of honour ahead of other criteria, 25 Of course, compared to West Germany's official development aid, which was distributed by the Ministry of Economics and ran into the hundreds of millions per year (e.g. DM 600 million in 1965) 26 , these were small sums. But developing countries sympathetic to the Federal Republic could, of course, hope to receive from the bigger pot as well.
Moreover, Daume made it a priority to undertake good-will tours to Africa to advertise the Games and deliver invitations to African NOCs. Judging from reports received from German embassies, the Foreign Office certainly thought these trips were a full success, not just as advertisement for the Games but more generally in PR terms for the Federal Republic. 'In African countries in particular [those responsible for sports] considered it a great honour to have the invitations delivered personally', one official noted. 27 On these occasions, Daume stressed the importance of African participation, in terms of team-size rather than visitor cohort. However, neither Daume nor his African audience were naive. Economic and social conditions made it difficult to stage Games of 'equal opportunity' and Daume came with a bag of presents to distribute in the spirit of 'Olympic comradeship'. African participation was largely made possible with generous financial aid from the Federal Republic. When he went to Lagos in December 1970, the gifts not only included DM 1 million in travel assistance to regional Olympic teams but also a track for West-African sprinters made of Rekortan, the same material used in Munich's Olympic stadium. 28 Even if African athletes were not all yet able to compete at the highest level, Daume correctly pointed out that this 'young continent' owned the future in sporting terms. Moreover, the Africans' presence was more than welcome not least because of their 'ability to join in festive celebrations' (Fähigkeit, sich festlicher Fröhlichkeit hinzugeben). Daume meant it sincerely, when he emphasized somewhat condescendingly that the Africans with their 'talents for rhythm, music, and dance' were the ideal antidote to nationalistic pathos and the political abuse of the Olympic idea. 29 As events related to the expulsion of Rhodesia on the eve of the Munich Games were to show two years later, this was wishful thinking. With the Rhodesian team already having arrived in Germany, the Organization of African Unity used the threat of a last-minute mass boycott of the Games by African states to assert its stance against white-minority rule in the former British colony and successfully forced the IOC into withdrawing its invitation to the Rhodesian athletes to participate.
At the time, however, Daume's message seems to have been well-received in West Africa, if the press is anything to go by. The Nigerian monthly magazine The People, for example, ran a positive 13-page article. By providing a colourful image of the Games, its editor stressed the great lengths to which the Munich hosts had gone to leave a lasting impression on their future guests. 30 The 'First World'
The majority of visitors from outside Germany were expected not from Africa and the developing world but from North America and Western Europe. While one of the organizers' aims was to ensure there would be no empty seats in the Olympic venues, they also wanted to use the Games' potential to increase tourist revenues as a whole, by encouraging foreign visitors to come not just for the Olympics but to spend some time in other parts of Bavaria and Germany. There was also a pragmatic reason for this, as Munich itself could not supply sufficient hotel beds for visitors. 31 Beyond these functional reasons, the Games were meant to 'refine North American sojourns, women were to be particularly addressed by advertisement, 'as Munich and Bavaria possessed a wealth of offers for the holidays also for women less interested in sports (important for couples!)'. 35 Most importantly, it seemed paramount to change perceptions of Germany across the Atlantic. In essence, the image of the Federal Republic had to be made 'more colourful' (farbiger) in order to counter the 'quasi neutral' manner in which the country was customarily seen. US citizens in particular respected West Germany's technological and economic achievements after the war but they did not love the country. At the same time, where negative or value-neutral components of Germany's image existed, they were, according to the Infratest poll, very well compensated for by the extraordinarily positive image of Munich. This was true even though those questioned voiced some concerns about a lack of friendliness in some hotels and restaurants in the city. 36 For the PR department, the best way to correct the Federal Republic's image was thus to transfer the positive attributes associated with Munich ('metropolis with a heart') and the Olympics ('serene Games') to the country as a whole. 37 Whether this was successful is impossible to judge. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that it may well have been. The author of a report about the OC's participation in the Steuben parade in New York, held annually in honour of the eponymous Germanborn general in the American Revolutionary Wars, for example, claimed that less than a year before the Games 'he could not discover any reservations concerning the fact that the Games take place in the Federal Republic and specifically in Munich'. Even the editor-in-chief of the German-Jewish émigré daily Aufbau had assured him that his paper would do all it could to make these Games a success. If there were concerns in the US, these related to the availability of tickets in the three disciplines which Americans were most interested in, that is, basketball, swimming, and track-and-field, as well as access to accommodation close to the Olympic venues. Americans seemed to fear that if they were put up somewhere close to the Alps their hotels would be as far from Munich as New York was from the Rockies. 38 The strategic PR goal of associating the positive characteristics of Munich and the Games with the Federal Republic as a whole was also to become the guiding principle of advertisement in Western Europe, where it was even more important to change perceptions due to recent history. By stressing that the Games would be 'serene', 'humane' and 'modest', it was thought possible to reduce the image of the 'newly-rich, perfectionist and emotionally cold German' who, the advertisers probably rightly believed, dominated perceptions of the post-war Federal Republic west of the Rhine. 39 Moreover, as the OC's press chief Hans ('Johnny') Klein pointed out, with attributes such as 'modern, without pathos [unpathetisch] , with serene colours', audiences in Western Europe could not 'suspect [the country of] falling back into totalitarian intentions'. 40 Nevertheless, rather than addressing those with larger disposable incomes, it was felt better in France and Britain to specifically target the younger generation, 'who [had] a more flexible and partly more positive attitude to the Federal Republic'. Here as well, women were to be addressed in particular, by stressing that the sports events were accompanied by an extensive cultural programme. 41 While French and other Western European audiences were meant to be seduced with ample references to culture and folklore, 'umpa music and Lederhosen' were to be downplayed in the UK to avoid reinforcing existing negative stereotypes. 42 
Means and Message
Technically, the Munich organizers relied on the standard PR and advertisement Despite the fact that the OC's limited financial finances meant that ads in foreign newspapers had to be foregone, the Munich campaign reached a large international audience. 44 Munich, a City Prepares alone was seen by an estimated 40 million people in 110 countries including the Eastern bloc. 45 Shortfalls in finances were at least partly compensated by access to the funding and infrastructure provided by national organisations already involved in foreign cultural diplomacy. InterNationes and the Federal Press Office, for instance, paid for around a third of the 500 copies of each of the films, and these were then shown by a variety of federal agencies abroad, including German trade missions, consulates, and embassies. 46 Public and private businesses in the tourism industry also played their part. West Germany's state-owned carrier Lufthansa, for instance, became the 'official airline' for Munich 1972 in return for distributing PR materials and free flights for members of the OC's executive board and general secretariat. 47 Likewise, the North German Lloyd made two of its large passenger ships, the MS Bremen and MS Europe, available for Olympic publicity. 48 Its Hamburg competitor Deutsche Atlantiklinie in turn provided two of its luxury vessels, the MS Hamburg and the MS Hanseatic, for the same purpose. The ships not only distributed PR materials during routine voyages and cruises but during 1970 also served as platforms for Olympic receptions in the harbours of New York, Lisbon, Copenhagen, Leningrad, Helsinki, and Stockholm. In New York in May 1970, the occasion was used to re-unite two sporting heroes of the past, Max Schmeling and Jesse Owens, who agreed to act as special ambassadors for Munich '72. 49 These receptions received a great deal of positive attention in the local press. According to Haas, their effect 'in bringing sympathies to the Federal Republic, could not be measured in figures'. 50 As a cost-saving measure, the Munich advertisers also convinced 55 foreign airlines and tourism organizations to show the Olympic films, display the architectural models, and distribute the PR and advertisement materials without charge. 51 These included carriers such as the Hungarian Malev and its Bulgarian and Czech equivalents, further evidence for improved relations with the Eastern bloc. 52 Tellingly, Interflug, East Germany's state-owned airline was not willing to advertise for Munich.
Equally, despite the rapprochement between the two German states after Willy Brandt became Chancellor in October 1969, the GDR state railways were unique in the Eastern bloc in not permitting Munich posters in its stations. 53 But intra-German problems were not the only political issues the advertisers faced. Saudi Arabian Airlines, for instance, insisted that the word 'Israel' should not be mentioned in the materials, nor were there to be any references to beer and alcohol. 54 Direct references to private enterprises and businesses in turn were forbidden by IOC regulations, a fact bemoaned by official Olympic sponsor CocaCola. The company nevertheless showed copies of the Olympic films during group visits to its filling stations and on occasion of sports events which it sponsored. 55 While virtually all PR and advertisement emphasized the qualities of the host city, it had to fulfil the additional function of transferring the positive attributes the international public already associated with Munich to Bavaria and the Federal Republic as a whole. As the following short analysis demonstrates, one excellent example of this strategy was the main brochure In the Middle of this City (Mitten in dieser Stadt), which was published in 15 different languages with a print run of 1.5 million copies. 56 From its title, which reinforced the idea of spatially compact Games Gemütlichkeit. In short, potential visitors were led to believe that Munich's atmosphere could be rediscovered wherever they went in Germany.
The Domestic Audience
Given the care and attention lavished on foreign audiences and the recognition that the Games were a unique opportunity for cultural diplomacy abroad, there was always the danger that a positive attitude at home would be taken for granted and the citizens and tax payers of the Federal Republic neglected by Olympic PR. And this is exactly what happened. Whatever PR measures were used at home, they were half-hearted. Moreover, they came with a delay compared to efforts abroad, as In general, Munich Olympic advertisement faced a domestic context which grew less enthusiastic about the mega-event as the years went on. With the exception of a marked dip in the year before the Games this followed a common logic described by Olympic sociologist Miquel de Moragas and others: from expectation (six to four years before), to mistrust and criticism in the local press (four to two years before), to agreement (one year before), to euphoria, local solidarity, and limited criticism (year of the Games). 60 At the same time, a number of specific reasons contributed to the worsening mood. First, in addition to the lack of attention paid to domestic audiences, there was the explosion of cost for the Games from initial estimates of around DM 500 million to c. 2 billion. This caused the West German press to become increasingly critical if not outright hostile. The organizers could no longer count on the near unanimous unquestioning support of journalists who had welcomed the idea during the application stage. Secondly, the German public increasingly suffered from Olympic fatigue. Nowhere was this more obvious than in the host city itself. Thirdly, the preparations for the Games fell into a period of discontent and social unrest in the Federal Republic. '1968' probably reinforced some of the above trends.
An EMNID poll in the summer of 1971 showed that German attitudes towards the Games were much less positive than the organizers had believed. While two thirds of the German population thought that the Games were 'a good thing' (eine gute Sache), a worryingly high 29 percent had no opinion on the issue whatsoever. 6 percent in turn thought the money invested would have been better spent on other things, e.g. public housing. 61 The mood five years earlier had certainly been better.
When the population was asked about its opinion in May 1966, 80 percent welcomed the IOC's choice of Munich as host city (with 9 percent against and 11 voicing no opinion). 62 Even if the grand picture still looked positive in 1971, the fact that approval rates had decreased was a matter of concern for the organizers. 'In the first place, the personal identification with the Games, the joy about "our Games" is still missing', the Executive Board of the OC noted with consternation. 63 At the same time, the organizers were well aware that the more emphasis they put on domestic advertisement, the more they would increase the 'desire of citizens to experience the Games in Munich directly'. 64 This would then increase pressure on tickets and accommodation, both of which were in limited supply.
Nowhere had the organizers a greater PR problem on their hands than in Munich here' (All den Dreck, den wir gehabt haben, mir langt's). 65 Tellingly, at this point the best the organizers felt they could hope to achieve in the host city was 'grumbling consent' (grantige Zustimmung). 66 Despite intensified efforts at winning over the population, not least in Munich, during the last 12 months before the Games, public opinion did not improve. Rather the opposite occurred. A further EMNID poll on the eve of the Games found that the number of those against and abstaining increased to 7 and 30 percent respectively, while those who liked the idea dropped to 63 percent. 67 
Conclusion
As the example of the domestic and international campaigns for the Munich Games show, for PR and advertisement to be successful, it is not only necessary for the means and message to be powerful, suggestive and targeted, but they need to be The 'First World' reception of the terrorist attack and its aftermath was ambivalent. On the one hand, the New York Times exculpated the authorities: 'Since the attack on the Olympic Village was unprecedented, the West German government was unprepared and had to improvise as events unfolded. The terrorists had the advantage of surprise, and of the near-chaos that surprise produced.' 68 On the other, the massacre dominated the US media for quite some time, with reports emphasizing the bungled German rescue attempt.
Perhaps the most surprising result the Games produced in PR terms concerned the host country itself. Asked a few days after the Games ended whether -'all things told, i.e., the serene atmosphere until the terrorist attack and then the terrorist attack itself' -they could be considered a success, 80 percent of West Germans replied in the affirmative, taking the polls back to their highpoint of 1966. 78 percent supported the IOC's decision to let the Games continue. 69 Despite the much praised performance of the West German Olympic team (particularly over the last few days), these are strikingly counterintuitive figures -not least because of those who supported the Games in the previous poll, the highest proportion did so in the belief they would contribute to peace and understanding. 70 However one wants to judge these figures, they do suggest caution with regards to Paulmann's claim that during the post-war era the Germans increasingly saw themselves through the prism of how they and their country were represented abroad. 71 The organizers of future mega-events in the Federal Republic certainly took note of the failure of 1972. While the terrorist attack perhaps had not turned the Games into an unmitigated PR disaster, the attempt to project an image of the country as a modern and well-organized, yet informal and easy-going society had certainly gone 
